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Defense and the 
Atlantic Alliance 
I T h e  Atlantic Alliance 
may be at the threshold of a new debate on the implications of ballistic 
missile defense (BMD) for European security. Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger and several U.S. Senators and Congressmen support a thorough 
review of U.S. BMD options, including possible revision of the 1972 Anti- 
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and its 1974 Protocol. Although active defense 
of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) seems the most likely application 
for BMD, other strategic defense options are reportedly under consideration. 
European-based BMD against theater ballistic missiles such as the SS-20, SS- 
21, SS-22, and SS-23 is being examined as well. Such defenses are known as 
anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM) or anti-tactical missiles (ATM). The term 
“ATM” is preferred in that it implies capability against cruise as well as 
ballistic missiles. 
The political and strategic issues that BMD programs could raise within 
the Alliance should be explored as deliberately as possible before economic 
resources are committed. Material for preliminary analysis resides in previous 
Alliance deliberations on BMD and in the informal discussions recently pro- 
voked in Europe by obvious U.S. interest in BMD options, including ATM. 
The issues go to the heart of NATO’s established theory of deterrence and 
offer an opportunity for fundamental reassessment. 
This essay is based on extensive interviews in Europe in 1980 and 1981. Despite obvious risks 
of over-simplification, owing to the diversity of views in each country on most issues, I have 
chosen to conform to standard practice by referring to the “Europeans“ as a shorthand for what 
appear to have been and to remain dominant trends in West European opinion. Special thanks 
are owed to Colin Gray, who first encouraged me to investigate this topic, and to various 
observers in government and industry (including Benson Adams, Guy Barasch, Charles Kup- 
perman, and Richard Nuttall) who commented on earlier drafts. The views expressed are 
nonetheless mine exclusively, and should not be construed to represent those of the Department 
of the Navy or any U.S. government agency. 
David S .  Yost is an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He 
is the author of European Security and the SALT Process, Washington Paper, Number 85 (Beverly 
Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1981) and editor of NATO’s Strategic Options: Arms Control 
and Defense (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981). 
International Security, Fall 1982 (Vol. 7, No. 2) 0162-28891821010143-32 $02.5010 
0 1982 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
143 
lnfernational Security I 144 
Alliance BMD Deliberations, 1967-1968 
The previous Alliance deliberations on BMD helped to form European atti- 
tudes that have become firmly entrenched over the past fifteen years. The 
principal deliberations took place in Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meetings 
from April 1967 through April 1968. The two key issues were U.S. plans for 
the Sentinel ABM system and the possibility of BMD in Europe. 
McNamara’s September 1967 speech announcing the decision to deploy 
the Sentinel ABM system for defense of the United States against projected 
Chinese strategic capabilities “created considerable resentment among the 
allies” for several reasons, including convictions that “the announcement 
had been made without sufficient consultation and that the United States 
had failed to honour its obligations to the NPG.” ’ The anti-Chinese orien- 
tation of Sentinel was seen in Europe as based on ”hysterical and dangerous” 
American fears of China, so that ”the dangers that are thought to arise from 
BMD deployment seem to be incurred for no good reason.”2 
These presumed dangers were partly those thoroughly articulated by the 
American opponents of BMD at approximately the same time-above all, 
that strategic stability and prospects for arms control and detente would be 
needlessly endangered by highly expensive technology that probably would 
not be reliably effective. Few indeed were the Europeans of that era who 
supported a U.S. BMD program as in the West European interest because it 
might promote coupling by assuring the continued invulnerability of Amer- 
ican retaliatory  force^.^ The most frequently offered West European argument 
against U.S. ABM deployment was that it would promote a neo-isolationist 
”Fortress America” concept, allowing Western Europe to stand alone and 
vulnerable. The West European reaction was admirably summarized by Johan 
Holst, recently the Norwegian state secretary for foreign affairs: 
It is, on the whole, surprising to note the extent to which European opinion 
has been so unanimously unfavorable to any deployment of ballistic missile 
defenses. The generally critical attitude does not differentiate between var- 
ious alternative U.S. BMD deployment configurations. . . . The expectation 
1. Paul Edward Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO,  1965-1974: The Experience 
of the Nuclear Planning Group (Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political . .  
Science, 1978), p. 114: 
2. Laurence W. Martin, Ballistic Missile Defence and the Alliance. Atlantic PaDer Number 1 (Bou- 
logne-sur-Seine, France: Atlantic Institute, 1969), p. 31. 
3. An example was Elizabeth Young in Survival, Vol. 12, No. 4 (April 1970), p. 149. 
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[is] that any BMD deployment is likely to generate an arms race which, in 
turn, will increase tensions between the two superpowers. . . . If, however, 
we assume a similar Russian BMD deployment, the threat the United States 
could mobilize on part of her allies might look less impressive the more the 
Soviet BMD promised to reduce the damage of any American retaliation. 
Hence, a bilateral BMD deployment might on balance also be perceived as 
reducing the validity of the g ~ a r a n t e e . ~  
Still further “overwhelmingly hostile” arguments were expressed in Eu- 
rope regarding BMD. Even ICBM defenses might lead to limited area defen- 
ses and thus to virtual “decoupling” of the U.S. guarantee, with an enhanced 
“possibility of nuclear war at Europe’s expense.” Superpower BMD deploy- 
ments could even serve the American purpose of “elimination of indepen- 
dent centres of nuclear power in the West,” and at the least would reinforce 
West European feelings of political-military inferiority and subordination. 
Finally, the European perception that ”BMD seems to be entirely concerned 
with fighting wars rather than with deterrence” guaranteed the concept a 
”chilly reception.” 
European distaste for the concept of BMD based in Europe was even more 
emphatic. In April 1968 the NPG decided that Europe-based BMD “would 
be too costly, not totally effective, and might compromise arms limitation 
discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union.” Denis Healey, 
then British secretary of state for defense, reportedly stressed “its prohibitive 
cost and lack of effectiveness against a Soviet a t t a ~ k . ” ~  
In contrast, Holst felt that the ”technical problem of providing some rea- 
sonably effective defense at a meaningful level in Europe is probably sur- 
mountable,” owing to the slower re-entry speed of medium-range ballistic 
missiles (MRBMs) (compared to ICBMs). Holst, however, did note three 
political obstacles to ABM deployment in Europe: 1) Since the kill mechanism 
would probably have to be nuclear, he foresaw “a political problem in terms 
of convincing a suspicious audience about the reliability of the design against 
4. Johan J. Holst, “Missile Defense: Implications for Europe,” in Johan J .  Holst and William J. 
Schneider, Jr., eds., W h y  ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy (New York Per- 
gamon Press, 1969), pp. 190,194. See also Theodore Sorenson, “The ABM and Western Europe,” 
in Abram Chayes and Jerome B. Wiesner, eds., ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an 
Antiballistic Missile System (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 179-83. 
5. Martin, Ballistic Missile Defense, pp. 29-36. 
6. Buteux, Politics of Nuclear Consultation, p. 123. 
7. Benson D. Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense (New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co., 
1971), pp. 137-138, 179. 
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accidents and abuse.” 2 )  Disagreements about which localities would be 
defended “could have disruptive rather than integrating effects” in the Al- 
liance. 3) Most important was the risk to detente, the ”danger that a BMD 
in Western Europe might tend to perpetuate a posture and atmosphere of 
confrontation.” Such political arguments, especially the latter, were proba- 
bly as important as the technical and financial ones offered by Healey. 
General European Views on BMD 
In 1969, the NPG took relatively little notice of the U.S. decision to revise the 
anti-Chinese orientation of Sentinel to a Safeguard system dedicated to pro- 
tection of U.S. retaliatory forces and to providing ”thin” area defenses against 
accidental or small attacks, Soviet or Chinese. This contrast in NPG reactions 
may be explained in part by a recognition by Europeans that theater nuclear 
weapons analyses would be “the area of greatest allied input into alliance 
nuclear policy,” with strategic force decisions mainly a U.S. responsibility. 
An additional factor may have been the imminent commencement of the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the prospect of negotiated con- 
straints on BMD. 
The ABM Treaty of 1972 and its 1974 Protocol were welcomed in Western 
Europe for all the reasons why BMD was recently opposed. The main benefit 
was seen as stabilization of the arms race and East-West relations generally, 
with a firm foundation for continuing detente. Ian Smart suggests three more 
specific reasons for West European approval: 1) The continued credibility of 
the British and French deterrents was enhanced. 2)  The United States insisted 
that Article IX of the ABM Treaty (which prohibits the transfer of ABM 
technology to third countries) would not prevent the transfer of offensive 
weapons technology. 3) The United States did not make itself less vulnerable 
to ballistic missile attack than its Allies.’O 
In the intervening years, Europeans have generally become even more 
sensitive to detente considerations, and the ABM Treaty has assumed special 
importance as a surviving ”keystone” of detente. U.S. interest in renegotiat- 
ing the ABM Treaty therefore appears dangerous and potentially destabiliz- 
ing to many in Western Europe, and abrogation still more so. An important 
8. Holst, “Missile Defense,” pp. 20Cb201. 
9. Buteux, Politics of Nuclear Consultation, pp. 162-163. 
10. Ian Smart, “Perspectives from Europe,” in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., 
SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 187, 191, 194. 
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example of this view is the statement of the Palme Commission, which 
includes such influential West European politicians as Egon Bahr, Jean-Marie 
Daillet, Gro Harlem-Bruntland, David Owen, and Joop den Uyl: 
If the ABM Treaty were abrogated and an unbridled offense/defense arms 
race ensued, the consequences would be severe. . . . as continued develop- 
ment of ABM systems buttressed the illusion that nuclear wars could be 
fought and survived in some meaningful sense, the risk of the use of nuclear 
weapons would multiply. Each side, fearing that the other might perceive 
advantage in a nuclear first-strike, might be tempted to act first. The insta- 
bilities and dangers in such a situation are obvious." 
These well-established general attitudes regarding BMD are reinforced by 
views in specific countries that illustrate the political obstacles within the 
Alliance that U.S. homeland BMD options and ATM might face. 
FRANCE 
Approximately fifteen years ago, when the prospects for BMD deployment 
for area defense in both the United States and the Soviet Union appeared 
serious, analysts predicted that the emerging French strategic nuclear force 
program would be deprived of all credibility by Soviet BMD; France could 
scarcely hope to build enough submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) 
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to saturate Soviet defenses. 
The 1972 ABM Treaty therefore provided a very welcome opportunity for the 
French to continue the expansion of their strategic nuclear force program. 
The French government could have reasonable confidence that its deterrent's 
political utility would not be rendered ineffective without at least some 
advance warning through public abrogation of the ABM Treaty by either 
superpower, or through intelligence regarding clandestine Soviet research 
and development in ABM that might offer the Soviets an option of rapid 
ABM deployment. 
What would the French do if more extensive and effective deployments 
take place? The official position for many years has been that such a threat 
is genuine, but that France is fully prepared for the eventuality.I2 One of the 
11. The SALT Process: The Global Stakes (Vienna, Austria: Independent Commission on Disar- 
mament and Security Issues, February 1981), pp. 2-3. 
12. Alain Bru and Lucien Poirier, "Dissuasion et defense anti-missiles," Revue de difense nationale, 
December 1968, p. 1828. Hugues de I'Estoile, Lucien Poirier, and Didier le Cerf, "Les implications 
strategiques de I'innovation technologique," Revue de dbfense nationale, January 1968, pp. 2S33, 
and February 1968, pp. 238-239. General Poirier, then a member of the Defense Ministry 
planning staff, was the key author of the 1968 documents that became the foundations of the 
still-valid 1972 defense white paper. 
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highest officials in the French Defense Ministry’s planning department, writ- 
ing under a pseudonym, explains that the ABM Treaty could be abrogated 
or circumvented (through air defense missile upgrades) at any time: 
Nevertheless our principal guarantee resides in the reciprocal surveillance 
the two superpowers maintain over each other; each is in fact most interested 
in assuring that the other will respect the ABM Treaty. . . . So long as ABM 
defenses remain at the current level, the multiple-warhead system [MRV] 
that will be in service with the M4 [SLBM] should be able to exhaust these 
defenses without too much difficulty and to assure the penetration of a 
significant portion of our strategic missiles. Moreover, what is called the 
”hardening” of warheads and missiles can make our missiles more invul- 
nerable to the effects of ABM warhead explosions. But still other solutions 
exist . . . [e.g.,] increasing the number of our missiles . . . [and] cruise 
missiles, which pose difficult problems for enemy defenses.13 
When he was deputy director of the planning department, Colonel Guy 
Lewin added that the number of warheads on existing missiles could also be 
increased.14 The director of military applications at the Commissariat 2 
I’Energie Atomique has declared that re-entry vehicle (RV) separation will be 
such that, in conjunction with hardening, no enemy interceptor will be able 
to destroy more than one RV.I5 Decoys and other penetration aids may be 
under consideration as well. 
At the same time, expressions of official concern have also been made. 
Foreign Minister Jean-Frangois Poncet in February 1981 reportedly “cautioned 
the Reagan administration against building large-scale anti-ballistic missile 
systems . . . on grounds that this would create instability in Europe.”’6 The 
director of the Foreign Ministry’s planning department has stated that revis- 
ing the ABM Treaty, even for ICBM defenses, “would weaken the technical 
credibility of our striking force with respect to the USSR.”17 
To date no relevant statements by the Mitterrand government have been 
made. It nonetheless seems plausible to assume that its officials would also 
oppose any revision of the ABM Treaty. Jean-Pierre Cot, now minister of 
13. Ivan Margine, “L‘avenir de la dissuasion,” Defense Nationale, April 1978, p. 10. 
14. Guy Lewin, ”L‘avenir des forces nuclkaires franGaises,” Defense Nationale, May 1980, p. 18. 
15. Jacques Chevallier, “Les armes et les ripostes mises en oeuvre par la defense franfaise,” in 
La France face aux dangers de guerre: Actes du Colloque, Vol. 1 (Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de 
Defense Nationale pour l’Association des Anciens Eleves de l’Ecole Nationale &Administration, 
1980), pp. 175-176. 
16. International Herald Tribune, February 26, 1981. 
17. Jean-Louis Gergorin, “Menaces et politiques dans la decennie 1980,” in La France face aux 
dangers de guerre, p. 65. 
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cooperation and development, once pointed out that Soviet BMD could 
undermine the French deterrent as part of his advocacy of French partici- 
pation in SALT negotiations.*8 Morever, the chief of staff of the armed forces, 
in discussing the decision to construct a seventh SSBN by 1994, added that 
it would not be reasonable, in view of France’s ”sufficiency” needs for 
deterrence, to have more than seven SSBNs by the end of the century; more 
than seven or eight SSBNs would lead France away from the ”sufficiency” 
prin~iple.’~ Evidently this concept of sufficiency, influenced in part by 
France’s economic capacity, assumes that Soviet BMD will not be upgraded 
beyond manageable limits. 
It is most improbable that France would reopen the decision announced in 
the 1972 White Paper against any French BMD program on the grounds of 
cost and probable ineffectiveness,20 given the short time-of-flight from the 
Soviet Union to France (around 10 to 12 minutes, of which 4 at most would 
be useful for interception).21 Even if France had the resources to pursue 
BMD, a French decision to do so could legitimize Soviet interest in BMD and 
thereby severely undermine the credibility of the French forces. In the mean- 
time, the French insist, as they have since 1967 when the question of IRBM 
vulnerability was first raised, that their fixed IRBMs are protected by their 
SLBMs. An attack against French IRBMs would be the plainest proof of 
aggression, and would justify strategic retaliation.22 In Giscard d’Estaing’s 
words in June 1980: “Any nuclear attack on French soil would automatically 
provoke strategic nuclear re ta l ia t i~n.”~~ The French would therefore probably 
oppose Europe-based U. S. BMD against Soviet theater missiles-the anti- 
tactical missile (ATM) concept-as likely to legitimize Soviet BMD. Any form 
of U.S. homeland BMD beyond the ABM Treaty regime’s limits would be 
seen as even more certain to provoke the expansion of Soviet BMD programs. 
BRITAIN 
British sensitivity regarding the ABM Treaty, and possible improved Soviet 
BMD within its confines, can be seen in the Chevaline program for hardened, 
18. Jean-Pierre Cot, “Plaidoyer pour l’inter@t national,” in La France face aux dangers de guerre, 
19. General Jeannou Lacaze, “La politique militaire,” Dkfense Nationale, November 1981, pp. 1s 
14. Cf. Mitterrand in Le Monde, July 2f5-27, 1981, p. 6.  
20. Livre blanc sur la diense nationale, Volume 1 (June 1972), p. 18. 
21. General Franfois Maurin in La France face aux dangers de guerre, pp. 389, 421. 
22. Defense Minister Pierre Messmer in L’Express, December 11, 1967. 
23. Giscard dEstaing in Le Monde, June 28, 1980. 
p. 202. 
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maneuvering and early separating re-entry vehicles with advanced decoys 
as penetration aids. The British government has acknowledged that, because 
of the Galosh ABM system protecting the Moscow region, the targeting list 
of “key aspects of Soviet state power” for British SLBMs may include targets 
outside Moscow-cities and “many high value targets, such as major dams 
and waterways, major oil refineries, major naval shipyards, major iron and 
steelworks, and major nuclear reactor establishments.” 24 Since these targets 
are presumably unprotected today, why did the British go to the expense of 
the long-secret Chevaline program (nearly €1 billion over the 1973-1980 pe- 
riod) to harden the SLBM RVs and equip them with penetration aids? Ap- 
parently both Chevaline and the July 1980 Trident SLBM decision assume 
possible improvements in Soviet BMD. Soviet construction of significant 
BMD would require enhanced British penetration capabilities. This concern 
is expressed delicately in public British documents: 
Though the Chevaline programme will keep our Polaris missiles able to 
penetrate anti-ballistic missile defences into the 1990s, continuing Soviet 
effort in research and development, allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty, might 
in time reduce our assurance of this. . . . [Trident I’s] MIRV capability and 
long range give excellent margins of long-term insurance against further 
advances in Soviet ABM and ASW capability. . . .25 
In other words, Britain’s position on BMD is similar to that of France. 
Precautionary steps have been taken in case Soviet BMD improves, while 
preservation of the ABM Treaty’s constraints is emphatically preferred. Some 
observers have speculated that Britain would find superpower ICBM defen- 
ses more acceptable than any area defenses. This might be tolerable in theory 
for the maintenance of the credibility of Britain’s deterrent, but even such 
ICBM defenses could promote the deployment of Soviet BMD that could be 
oriented to defense of population centers and other targets of potential British 
interest. No official British preferences have been expressed other than con- 
tinuance in force of the existing ABM Treaty and Protocol provisions. 
British interest in BMD is even less likely than French, given that the 
British have no hardened retaliatory forces to protect and greater financial 
constraints. British officials would probably oppose the ATM concept as 
24. Official evidence in the Tzoelfth Report from the Expenditure Committee, cited in Lawrence 
Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 47. See also Freedman’s 
useful discussion of Chevaline, pp. 48-51. 
25. The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force (London: Ministry of Defense, July 
1980), pp. 7, 20. This statement would also apply to the even longer-range and more effective 
Trident I1 (D-5), which is to be purchased in lieu of Trident 1. 
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likely to endanger the ABM Treaty. Because of Britain’s close relationship 
with the United States in strategic nuclear matters, some observers have 
speculated that the British might be more likely than the French to accept 
readily a U.S. decision to seek extensive revisions in the ABM Treaty regime 
if BMD came to seem overwhelmingly necessary to preserve the credibility 
of the U.S. guarantee; that credibility might be seen as a higher priority than 
maintenance of the ABM Treaty for the sake of the penetrability of British 
RVs. Although such arguments might be adopted as rationalizations if Britain 
had no other choice, this speculative distinction between British and French 
views would almost certainly prove unfounded in practice. Britain would 
oppose revision of the ABM Treaty regime as firmly as France. 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is perhaps more 
keenly aware than other European governments that the continuing credi- 
bility of the British and French deterrents is in the interest of Western Europe 
in general. This reason for favoring continuation of the ABM Treaty regime 
is, however, probably secondary to the Treaty’s perceived importance for the 
future of detente and stability in East-West political relations. Favoring con- 
tinuation of the ABM Treaty regime is implicit in the FRG’s support for the 
continuing SALT/START arms control process, which is deemed “of per- 
manent importance in all political efforts aimed at safeguarding peace and 
achieving stabilization in the East-West balance of power.”*‘j 
At a time when U.S. strategic arms control policy remains under review, 
the ABM Treaty appears to be one of the few surviving pillars of detente- 
a link to the optimistic early years of the Ostpolitik initiated in 1969 by the 
current SPD-FDP government. Unilateral U.S. action to alter the ABM Treaty 
regime would be more upsetting than Soviet-American agreement on a 
revision, but no revision at all seems preferred. Perhaps even more than 
elsewhere in NATO Europe, the negative impression prevails that BMD is a 
technology more oriented to nuclear war-fighting than deterrence. 
Given these general attitudes, the FRG would probably not welcome U.S. 
interest in the ATM concept. Yet West Germany would be the key European 
ally regarding ATM. A major share of the new intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (including all the Pershing 11s) are to be based in the FRG. Moreover, 
since Britain and France, who in any case have a special nuclear status, are 
26. White Paper 1979: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the 
Federal Armed Forces (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defence, 1979), p. 69. 
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unlikely to take any initiative on ATM, the rest of the Allies (and the U.S. 
Congress) would await a West German decision with the keenest interest. 
A positive ATM decision from the current West German government 
would be likely only under some combination of the following conditions: 1) 
further obvious deterioration of detente; 2) a strong and consistent U.S. 
commitment to ATM; 3) non-nuclear kill (NNK) mechanisms in the ATM 
system; 4) favorable financing and production arrangements; 5) deployment 
of ATM on the soil of at least two other non-nuclear Continental members 
of NATO-probably Belgium and Italy; 6) a NATO Council endorsement of. 
the ATM concept; and 7) however paradoxical, the establishment of an 
appropriate arms control negotiating context that would demonstrate West 
Germany’s interest in the continuation of detente and preference for an arms 
control solution. These conditions may be predicted from the recent history 
of West German participation in NATO theater nuclear modernization deci- 
sions; most, if not all, would probably apply with a CDUKSU-led govern- 
ment as well.27 
Some doubt that the ATM concept would be accepted even by a CDU/ 
CSU-led government, even with these conditions-if they could all be ful- 
filled. Hans Ruhle of the CDU-sponsored Konrad Adenauer Foundation has, 
for example, published a view of ”profound skepticism” regarding the ATM 
option: ”. . . this option appears neither technologically practicable within 
acceptable financial limits at present, nor is there any prospect of an optim- 
ized combination of strategic defense systems in the foreseeable future.” 28 
The Alliance difficulties U.S. BMD programs might face become even 
clearer when both limited U.S. homeland options (ICBM defenses and ”thin” 
area defenses) and potentially extensive U.S. homeland BMD are examined 
from a European perspective. 
U .  S. BM D A1 terna tives 
LIMITED U.S. HOMELAND BMD OPTIONS 
ICBM defenses constitute the least controversial option for three reasons. 
27. See David S. Yost and Thomas C. Glad, “West German Party Politics and Theater Nuclear 
Force Modernization Since 1977,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 1982), in 
press. 
28. Hans Riihle, “A European Perspective on the US.-Soviet Strategic-Military Relationship,” 
in William Schneider, Jr., et al., U.S. Strategic-Nuclear P o k y  and Ballistic Missile Defense: The 2980s 
and Beyond (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980), p. 51. 
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First, the technical feasibility of defense of hardened ICBM launchers seems 
increasingly credible, especially if leverage could be provided through mobile 
and/or deceptive basing. Second, ICBM defenses would not violate the long- 
standing offense-dominant verities of the “assured destruction” outlook. Pre- 
launch survivability of retaliatory forces would be enhanced with no degra- 
dation of their ability to penetrate to countervalue targets; the assumed 
stability of mutual counter-society threats would be unimpaired. Third, pre- 
cisely because Soviet cities and other “countervalue” targets would remain 
undefended under this hypothetical revised ABM Treaty regime, British and 
French nuclear forces would retain their ability to penetrate to their presumed 
targets. Nonetheless, any attempt to revise the ABM Treaty regime to accom- 
modate ICBM defenses could become controversial in Europe. Fears of an 
arms race destabilizing East-West relations would probably surpass more 
technical concerns about possible expansion and reorientation of ICBM de- 
fenses to area defenses, and so forth. 
Limited area defenses would probably be even more controversial in Eu- 
rope. Jan Lodal has made probably the strongest case for limited U.S. area 
defenses, partly on the grounds that they would strengthen the credibility 
of U S .  guarantees to Allies. Lodal reasons that 
an active defense would eliminate any Soviet incentive to carry out “limited’ 
nuclear attacks against U.S. territory, even if the United States had used 
tactical nuclear weapons to stop a Soviet invasion. The defense would be 
capable of intercepting a small-scale attack; a Soviet leader would have to 
launch a large attack (several thousand warheads) to penetrate these defen- 
ses. A rational Soviet leader ought to be deterred from launching such an 
attack, realizing that an assured destruction response is a much more credible 
reaction to an attack of several thousand warheads than to an attack of a few 
warheads.29 
In Lodal’s proposal for limited area defenses, mutual Soviet-American “as- 
sured destruction” capabilities would remain the guarantors of strategic sta- 
bility. But what Lodal calls ”a second ’firebreak in the ladder of escalation” 
(in addition to the NATO-assumed conventional/nuclear firebreak) would be 
created: the United States could use battlefield nuclear weapons with less 
risk of catastrophic Soviet retaliation against the U.S. homeland. 
Lodal rightly points out probable European objections to such area de- 
29. Jan M. Lodal, “Deterrence and Nuclear Strategy,” Daedalus, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Fall 1980), 
p. 167. 
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fenses. Even more than with ICBM defenses, the main European concerns 
would include fear of an arms race undermining prospects for detente and 
the legitimization of Soviet area defenses possibly reducing the effectiveness 
of British and French nuclear forces. Above all, limited U.S. area defenses 
”would make it relatively more likely that a war could be fought in Europe 
alone, without involving U.S. territory-a result that would be decried as 
decoupling.” Although the ongoing debate about the prospective deploy- 
ment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) has shown great resonance 
among European publics of the false argument that the U.S. purpose in INF 
modernization is to ”confine a nuclear war to Europe,” Lodal’s proposal is 
intended to maximize that possibility. Lodal judges that implementation of 
his proposal would nonetheless be “healthy for the alliance,” because of the 
increased credibility of U.S. guarantees and thus the reduced likelihood of 
any conflict, even at the conventional level, in Europe: ”No possible strategy 
can fully satisfy the European countries. . . . our European allies continue to 
look for an easy solution where none exists.”30 
EXTENSIVE U.S.  HOMELAND BMD 
In rejecting such proposals for ”thin” area defenses, Colin Gray rightly points 
out that ”small-scale nuclear strikes are not much in keeping with what is 
known about Soviet military style.” Accordingly, Gray suggests that 
a ”thick,” or truly serious, multi-level [BMD] deployment would usefully 
reduce American self-deterrence and so enhance the credibility of the ex- 
tended deterrent. . . . in the absence of substantial homeland protection, 
U.S. strategic nuclear forces lack both credibility as an extended deterrent 
threat and ability in the event of need. The Soviet Union cannot be certain 
that this is so (even incredible threats deter to some extent) but the required 
quality of deterrence, its robustness in periods of very acute political stress, 
could well be lacking if the U.S. homeland continues to be totally at nuclear 
risk.31 
More credible extended deterrence guarantees could thus be a by-product of 
extensive homeland defenses. 
A true ”damage-limiting” posture could, however, also include a theory 
of “escalation dominance” oriented toward controlling the Soviet Union’s 
30. Ibid., p. 171. Herman Kahn has expressed a similar attitude toward probable West European 
objections to U.S. BMD programs: “They won’t like it, of course, but they are sensible people 
when they’re forced to be sensible.” (U.S. News and World Report, September 21, 1981, p. 54). 
31. Colin S. Gray, “A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defence,” Survival, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Marchi 
April 1981), p. 68. 
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power projection advantages in Eurasia as well as denying the Soviets op- 
portunities to play upon the probability of self-deterrence in an undefended 
America. In other words, while the ”assured destruction” verity of near-total 
population vulnerability would be discarded, U.S. operational capabilities for 
strategic nuclear war, both offensive and defensive, would be improved in 
order to make implausible any Soviet theory of victory. Stability would be 
derived from a U.S. ability to dominate any escalation process by limiting 
damage to its population centers as well as its military assets. The United 
States could thus extend and honor guarantees-including, if necessary, first 
use of nuclear weapons-with less risk of self-deterrence because there would 
be less risk of homeland damage. Because deterrence would be improved, 
war would be less probable, and less catastrophic, if it occurred. 
All the premises of this compelling and logically consistent strategic pre- 
scription are rejected by partisans of the “assured destruction” model of 
deterrence and stability, who are even more predominant in Western Europe 
than in the United States. It is assumed that reliable population defenses are 
infeasible in an offense-dominant world, and that any Soviet-American com- 
petition in defensive measures would dangerously destabilize the strategic 
nuclear balance, in addition to being self-defeating and extremely 
Even more than with limited defenses, Europeans would almost certainly 
deplore U.S. interest in extensive area defenses as undermining, if not de- 
stroying, the peace-preserving structure of deterrence; as possibly sliding 
from proper control of self-deterrence to a ”first-strike” posture; as attempt- 
ing to confine any future nuclear war to Europe; and as encouraging the 
Soviet Union to construct similar defenses. 
Even if Europeans could generally accept Gray’s judgment that, in “the 
context of U.S. BMD deployment, Soviet BMD would not be a destabilizing 
de~elopment ,”~~ extensive Soviet defenses could make the need for costly 
improvements in conventional and battlefield nuclear forces in Europe more 
obvious. NATO’s strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces could not 
be as readily applied to deterring Soviet attacks with conventional or battle- 
32. Calling this model of deterrence and stability ”assured destruction” is admittedly somewhat 
unfair in that, despite popular perceptions to the contrary, U.S. targeting and operational 
doctrine has for many years included numerous counterforce and counter-military options. 
“Assured destruction” nonetheless became the shorthand characterization of U.S. declaratory 
policy in the late 1960s, and retains a certain descriptive merit owing to grave U.S. and West 
European deficiencies in active and passive defenses. Those who believe such deficiencies 
technologically unavoidable and strategically stabilizing carry forward the “assured destruction” 
logic of the late 1960s. 
33. Gray, ”New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense,” p. 65. 
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field nuclear forces because Soviet defenses would directly counter them. 
The recent political trials of sustaining an approximate three percent annual 
real increase in defense spending in NATO Europe suggest how welcome 
new programs for extensive conventional force improvement would be. 
Moreover, extensive Soviet area defenses, more than ICBM or limited area 
defenses, would tend to reduce the deterrent value of the British, French, 
and (incidentally) Chinese nuclear forces. Putting aside the question of how 
great that deterrent value is in U.S. (or, more importantly, Soviet) eyes, the 
continued technical credibility of these nuclear forces is meaningful to more 
Europeans than those in the British and French governments. The United 
States was especially hostile to the French nuclear effort during the 1960s, 
when Robert McNamara was secretary of defense. For over a decade, how- 
ever, U.S. policy has accepted, even vaguely approved, maintenance of the 
French forces (in, for example, the 1974 NATO Ottawa communiqub), though 
still not with the degree of active cooperation accorded to the British. While 
damage-limiters could argue that the greater good of the Alliance would be 
served by the improved deterrence derived from extensive U.S. area defen- 
ses, and that smaller independent deterrents would be less necessary, many 
Europeans would probably be skeptical, to say the least. 
Still another West European argument against U.S. homeland BMD is that 
the resultant Soviet homeland BMD would undermine the U.S. ability to 
execute limited strategic options. While U.S. penetration technology could 
perhaps overcome Soviet defenses, the Soviets could nonetheless defend 
against limited strategic nuclear strikes more readily than against greater 
ones and could thus oblige the United States to consider more extensive 
options-increasingly less distinguishable from general nuclear response-in 
order to honor the guarantee. This is the obverse of the Lodal argument for 
"thin" area defenses, and it applies with even greater force if more extensive 
BMD programs in the United States and the Soviet Union are envisaged. The 
United States may well be self-deterred from executing any limited strategic 
options. Moreover, even if the United States were not self-deterred from 
employing such options, what value could they have when the United States 
is defenseless against the virtually inevitable Soviet strategic nuclear re- 
sponses? 
Finally, West Europeans remain skeptical about the arms control argu- 
ments for U.S. homeland BMD set forth by some Americans. Such arguments 
presume that Soviet and U.S. BMD programs would permit both sides to 
limit or even sharply reduce offensive strategic nuclear forces because ICBMs 
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and other targets would be defended. Abrogation or revision of the ABM 
Treaty would be necessary, but extensive superpower homeland BMD could 
theoretically also promote strategic stability by minimizing the effects of 
cheating on negotiated offensive force levels and, more importantly, by 
enhancing uncertainty as to the cost and feasibiIity of offensive strike plans. 
Crisis stability could be improved by reductions in retaliatory force vulnera- 
bility, and by ”allowing for nonnuclear interceptor launch under real or 
apparent attack.”34 European doubts derive from their judgment that super- 
power BMD would in practice not result in limitations or reductions in 
offensive forces, and would probably promote instability through intensified 
competition instead. 
U S .  Interest in ATM 
Defense Secretary Harold Brown apparently did not even consider the fea- 
sibility of ATM defenses for the planned new intermediate-range nuclear 
forces (1NF)-the ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing 11s 
(P-11s) scheduled to begin deployment in 1983-when he made the following 
assessment: 
If TNF are to provide a credible deterrent, they must be highly survivable in 
the aggregate, at least against conventional or limited nuclear attack. To a 
large extent, force survivability against these threats depends on mobility 
and concealment from Warsaw Pact target acquisition systems. Given the 
relatively limited deployment area for NATO land-based systems and short 
time of flight for Soviet ballistic missiles, absolute survivability against large- 
scale, bolt-out-of-the-blue nuclear attacks is probably infeasible and certainly 
excessively [Emphasis added] 
This view is similar to the general European view expressed by RAF Marshall 
Sir Neil Cameron: “We can, of course, do nothing against a ballistic missile 
attack but dig deep. . . .”36 
34. G.E. Barasch et al., Ballistic Missile Defense: A Potential Arms-Control Initiative, LA43632 (Los 
Alamos, New Mexico: Los Alamos National Laboratory, January 1981), p. 23. While this study 
presents perhaps the most complete version of such arguments, similar ideas about BMDs 
potentially beneficial effects for strategic stability have been expressed by Herman Kahn, James 
R. Schlesinger, and others. 
35. Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington, D.C.: US. 
Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 146. 
36. Neil Cameron, “Defense and the Changing Scene,” RUSl Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 
1980), p. 26. For a similar American view on the indefensibility of Europe, see Lodal, “Deterrence 
and Nuclear Strategy,” p. 171. 
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In contrast, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Research and 
Engineering James Wade has made the following evaluation: 
The question of active defense for theater nuclear forces is being looked at 
quite carefully. . . . it is reasonably clear that such a course could have 
merit. . . . both the GLCM and P-I1 are designed to achieve survivability 
against a number of threats through covert field deployment, frequent relo- 
cation in the field, and the reduction of signatures associated with field 
deployment. This mode of operation assumes enough warning to disperse 
to covert field sites prior to an attack.37 An ATM could reduce the importance 
of warning time. . . .% 
Since Wade‘s statements, it has been reported in more specific terms that 
arming the Patriot missile with a nuclear warhead for defense against Soviet 
theater missiles is under consideration. “A separate study contract is ex- 
pected from the Army for development of a non-nuclear warhead for theater 
BMD to avoid the problem of obtaining release authority if Patriot is equipped 
with a nuclear warhead.” 39 This report is consistent with other unofficial 
American discussions of theater ATM capable of neutralizing the threat posed 
by the SS-20 and other Soviet theater missiles, which could have conven- 
tional, nuclear, or chemical warheads. 
It is not yet clear whether reported research activities will result in actual 
ATM programs. No plans currently exist to replace or supplement the nu- 
clear-armed Nike-Hercules air defense system with new nuclear-warhead 
active defenses,40 or with conventional-warhead systems capable of theater 
ATM defenses. If ATM programs were pursued, they could face serious 
opposition in Western Europe, given established views on BMD in general 
and special factors in Britain, France, and the FRG. Six problematic issues 
could inhibit or even frustrate a U.S. initiative in favor of ATM: technological 
credibility, Soviet countermeasures, Alliance cohesion, military rationales, 
implementation of INF modernization, and arms control issues (including 
INF negotiations as well as SALT-re-named START by the United States in 
November 1981-and the ABM Treaty). 
37. Wade in U.S., Senate, Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense Authorization for 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981, Hearings, Part 5, Research and Development, March 13, 1980 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 3013-3014. 
38. Wade cited in ”Protection for Europe-Based Nuclear Missiles,” Flight Intevnational, October 
18, 1980, p. 1496. 
39. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 22, 1981, p. 89. 
40. The FY 1983 Department of Defense Program for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Statement 
by the Honorable Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering 
to the 97th Congress, March 2, 1982, pp. VII-14. 
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Technological Credibility of ATM 
European experts, to say nothing of politicians and the general public, will 
not be easily convinced of the technical feasibility of ATM defenses. The 
tendency is to assume that the infeasibility of reliable BMD was long ago 
established at the intercontinental level, and that shorter distances, shorter 
warning times, and lower trajectories make theater BMD even more difficult. 
BMD technology has in fact advanced, particularly in such areas as discrim- 
ination, computerization, data processing, radar, and other-i.e., optical- 
detection systems. Moreover, because the distance and duration of their 
boost flight phases are relatively short, theater ballistic missiles (especially 
the SS-21 and SS-23) have significantly slower re-entry speeds than SLBMs, 
ICBMs, and longer-range theater ballistic missiles like the SS-22 and the SS- 
20. Shorter flight-times tend to aggravate (or, as BMD specialists say, 
"stress") the intercept problem, while slower re-entry speeds tend to simplify 
it. 
Skepticism has focused initially on the reported idea of using Patriot in an 
ATM role. When the Patriot study program (then called SAM-D) was started 
in the mid-l960s, an ATM role was envisaged, in addition to a capacity 
against high-performance aircraft at high and low altitudes. U.S. policy (as 
reflected in the NPG deliberations) then favored consideration of ATM. How- 
ever, the ATM requirement was later dropped because of costs and the 
challenges of defending against heavy nuclear attacks, in addition to the 
Alliance recommendation against theater BMD. Patriot is now intended to 
serve as a replacement for the Hawk and Nike-Hercules air defense systems. 
Patriot radars are presumably designed only for anti-aircraft operations. Even 
if equipped with radars and data processing for ATM-capable discrimination 
and responsiveness, Patriot might not be prompt and accurate enough for 
an ATM role unless a nuclear warhead were used as the kill mechanism. 
Even then some observers would have grave doubts, especially concerning 
the higher re-entry speeds of longer-range Soviet missiles (e.g., the SS-20 
and the SS-22). Developing a low-performance range ATM (on the basis of 
the Patriot, or, in the Soviet case, the SA-10) capable of intercepting cruise 
missiles or slower, shorter-range ballistic missiles (e.g., the SS-21 and SS-23) 
would be less challenging than developing a new high-performance missile. 
Probably only an entirely new high-performance ATM missile, if equipped 
with effective sensing and homing devices, could avoid the requirement for 
nuclear warheads. 
The potential necessity for nuclear warheads, which would pose the polit- 
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ical problem of introducing new nuclear weapons systems in Western Eu- 
rope, underlines the many advantages of non-nuclear kill (NNK) mecha- 
nisms. These advantages would include reduced manpower requirements; 
simplified logistics, security, and command, control, and communications; 
minimized risk to allies; no self-inflicted nuclear effects-i.e., electromagnetic 
pulse (EMF’) or blackout-hindering radars and communications systems; no 
requirement for nuclear weapon materials; simplified release authority; and 
confidence in system reliability, because total system testing is feasible, in- 
cluding destruction of incoming target warheads. Even though NNK war- 
heads, designed for either direct impact or high explosive detonation near 
the RV, are cheaper than nuclear warheads, skepticism about NNK cost- 
effectiveness and reliability will persist until research (including operations 
research) leads to more definitive conclusions and the publication of author- 
itative assessments. 
Although some observers, perhaps correctly, deem ATM ”the only effec- 
tive option” for “a reasonable degree of survivability” for NATO theater 
nuclear forces, including INF,41 one recent official discussion of ATM tech- 
nology noted the need to consider its costs and effectiveness in the context 
of alternatives to ATM: 
The technology required to defend against an IRBM attack includes: Acqui- 
sition and tracking radar capable of picking up and tracking an incoming 
warhead; rapid, sophisticated signal processing equipment to allow firing an 
interceptor within a few seconds; a high-speed, high acceleration missile 
which can reach the incoming warhead in time to kill it at a sufficient range 
to preclude damage to the defended target; adequate terminal homing; and 
an interceptor warhead capable of destroying the incoming reentry body. In 
addition, if a system is to be used to defend a mobile target such as a 
Pershing launcher, all of the interceptors and supporting equipment must 
have mobility consistent with that of the target to be defended. This tech- 
nology is attainable; much of it exists from our ABM development work, 
although there are differences between defending fixed targets against 
ICBMs, and defending mobile ones against IRBMs. What will be at issue is 
the degree to which ATM hardware contributes to survivability in the aggre- 
gate, what other active and passive measures can enhance survivability, arms 
control consideration, cost of ATM alternatives, and the best technical ap- 
proach should we elect to field such a system. . . . 
41. Wayne R. Winton, “Applications of BMD Other Than ICBM Defense,” in U.S. Arms Control 
Objectives and the Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense, Proceedings of a Symposium held at the 
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1-2, 1979 (Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: Puritan Press, 1980), p. 96. Cf. Carnes Lord, ”The ABM Question,” Commentary, 
Vol. 69, No. 5 (May 1980), p. 38. 
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We are not far enough along in our examination of this complex issue to 
have the answers to all these questions. . . . While we are not yet prepared 
to estimate what such a system might cost, I am certain that the cost would 
be substantial. . . .42 
Alternatives to ATM would presumably include improved dispersal planning 
and mobility, deception, redundancy, and signature reductions. 
The ABM development work that may be of greatest relevance to ATM is 
that on the Low Altitude Defense System (LoADs), which consists of small 
radars and interceptors designed for possible mobile deployment with the 
MX ICBM. In conjunction with emerging technology for endoatmospheric 
NNK, LoADs development might be directly applicable to ATM.43 Nonethe- 
less disagreement within the technical community persists as to the feasibility 
of reasonably effective BMD, owing to technical and operational problems, 
including the challenge of reliable NNK.@ 
Uncertainties would persist, even with reliable NNK. Endoatmospheric 
interception with NNK of the chemical warheads the Soviets have reportedly 
deployed on theater ballistic missiles could be less than satisfactory, since 
such an interception over Allied territory could spread the chemicals, de- 
pending on the altitude of the interception and other factors. Prompter 
interceptions might therefore provide better solutions against Soviet chemical 
warheads over the long term. 
High-level NNK interceptions over Allied territory could also represent a 
problem if the Soviets designed their warheads with the mechanism of "sal- 
vage-fusing," whereby incoming RVs might be detonated by the impact of 
the interceptor's kill mechanism. While the obvious advantage of intercepting 
the Soviet warhead several miles away from its intended target would re- 
main, a "salvage-fusing" nuclear explosion could interfere with subsequent 
Allied defenses because of its effects on radar and communications systems. 
However improbable the "salvage-fusing" possibility seems-owing to its 
great cost and difficulty, and risk of catastrophic failure-it could serve as a 
42. Wade, in DoD Authorization . . . FY 2982, p. 3014. 
43. Winton, "Applications of BMD'; Jonathan E. Medalia, Antiballistic Missiles, Issue Brief, 
Number IB81003 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, September 1, 1981), p. 15. 
44. For somewhat contrasting assessments of BMD technology, see the Los Alamos study cited 
in note 34; Guy Barasch, Nikki Cooper, and Ray Pollock, Ballistic Missile Defense: A Quick-Look 
Assessment, LA-UR-8CL1578 (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, June 1980); Chapter 3 (on BMD) 
of U.S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, M X  Missile Basing (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1981); and the articles by William A. Davis, Jr., Deputy Ballistic 
Missile Defense Project Manager, in National Defense, September/October 1979 and December 
1981. 
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basis for European technical skepticism. Such uncertainties as the technical 
effectiveness of NNK ATM would not necessarily deprive ATM of all deter- 
rent value. Resultant Soviet uncertainties as to the effectiveness of their 
offensive strikes could still be helpful to deterrence. 
Soviet ATM Countermeasures 
Soviet responses to a U.S. ATM program for NATO could be offensive, 
defensive, and political. 
Offensive responses would be systems designed to destroy, overwhelm, 
or circumvent Western ATM systems. Given the deficiencies of NATO’s 
current air defenses, the Soviets could attack the ATM radars and other 
components with air-breathing systems. Improved air defenses and ATM 
defenses would therefore both be required in a serious damage-limiting effort 
by NATO. 
ATM systems could also be saturated by the Soviets at specific points of 
interest, at costs partly dependent upon the sophistication and number of 
Soviet penetration aids as opposed to the ATM’s discrimination capability 
and cost-effectiveness. Even without penetration aids, the numbers of RVs 
on Soviet theater ballistic missiles are very high: 
The number of NATO military installations which the Soviets might target 
with nuclear weapons is, at most, approximately three hundred. The Soviets 
presently have ten delivery systems for each target, and when the SS-20 has 
been fully fielded they will have ten weapons for each target in this system 
alone. . . . The Soviet motivation for this tremendous capability, enabling 
them to destroy every military installation in NATO ten times over, continues 
to be a mystery in the West.45 
The Soviet capability seems excessive, even allowing for redundancy to 
compensate for reliability uncertainties and the hypothetical contingencies of 
Western pre-emption or intra-war attrition, and to cover an even more am- 
bitious target set in Western Europe. Some Western analysts have offered 
deceptively reassuring explanations in speculating that extra-rational factors 
(e.g., bureaucratic politics or cultural tradition) may account for the high 
numbers of Soviet deployments. The Soviets may also be deploying militarily 
45. Francis X. Kane, “Safeguards from SALT: U.S. Technological Strategy in an Era of Arms 
Control,” in Paul H. Nitze et al., The Fateful Ends and Shades of SALT (New York: Crane, Russak 
and Co., 1979), p. 116. 
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redundant INF for negotiating purposes, i.e., no loss of required target 
coverage, even if negotiations result in reductions. Whatever the explana- 
tions, the seemingly redundant warheads in effect constitute double insur- 
ance against potential future ATM capabilities-an impressive capacity to 
overwhelm ATM, which in turn works to discourage NATO from pursuing 
such systems. If an ATM were to cast doubt on the effectiveness of systems 
such as the SS-22 or SS-20, the Soviets would probably use it as a new 
rationale to deploy even more numerous and effective INF; this would make 
technical and cost-effectiveness arguments for ATM even more difficult for 
Western proponents. 
Although Soviet redundancy in theater ballistic missile numbers makes it 
improbable, another Soviet offensive countermeasure could be attacking tar- 
gets defended by European-based ATM with SLBMs and ICBMs. Knowl- 
edgeable observers assume that approximately 120 of the SS-11 ICBMs, as 
well as some SS-19 ICBMs, may have targets in Europe.46 This means that a 
fully credible ATM would require an ability to intercept the very rapid ICBM 
and SLBM RVs, while the latter might come from any direction. (ICBM RVs 
could also come from any direction if the Soviets used the Fractional Orbital 
Bombardment System [FOBS], or orbited missiles; but these delivery tech- 
niques seem improbable as concerns targets in Europe.) An imperfect ability 
to defend against certain types of Soviet intermediate-range missiles would 
nonetheless constitute an improvement over the current situation, in which 
no defense exists against Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs, or intermediate-range mis- 
siles. 
Defensive Soviet countermeasures would consist of expanded BMD sys- 
tems. Since the ABM Treaty was signed, Soviet BMD research and devel- 
opment has been more intensive than that of the United States. Moreover, 
in contrast to the United States, the Soviets retain active BMD capabilities 
around Moscow, permitted by the ABM Treaty and its Protocol, and continue 
to perfect radars and air defense interceptor missiles for possible future 
upgrading to BMD roles. Whether the United States retains an advantage in 
the key areas of BMD technology is no longer clear; at the least, comparative 
U.S. advantages in certain areas have probably been reduced since 1972, 
given the contrasting levels of investment effort under the ABM Treaty 
regime. Although the United States perhaps retains an edge in some areas, 
46. Lawrence Freedman, "The Dilemma of Theatre Nuclear Arms Control," Survival, Vol. 23, 
No. 1 (January/February 1981), p. 5. 
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for example, battle management and discrimination technologies and exoat- 
mospheric nonnuclear kill mechanisms, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
dimensions of the U.S. lead in ABM technology have been significantly 
reduced. The Soviets may be better placed than the U.S. to deploy effective 
BMD in a timely fashion.47 
Even if new BMD programs could be restricted through Soviet-American 
negotiations to capabilities against theater ballistic missiles, Soviet ATM, like 
U.S. ATM, could be virtually indistinguishable in practice from systems 
capable of intercepting ICBM and SLBM RVs. For full technical credibility, 
ATM systems would almost have to be capable of such interceptions. Geo- 
graphical asymmetry would favor the USSR, in that a Soviet ATM, whether 
capable of ICBM and SLBM RV interceptions or not, could defend the home- 
land as well as Allies. U.S. ATM in Western Europe would defend Allies 
alone, not the U.S. homeland. Some analysts speculate that the recent con- 
solidation of the Soviet Troops of National Air Defense (PVO Strany) with 
the troops of Air Defense of the Ground Forces (PVO SV) may be related to 
new problems posed by overlapping strategic and theater BMD challenges, 
though the centralization of air defenses could also be explained by other 
managerial aims.48 Moreover, there remains the possibility that Soviet testing 
of air defense systems in an ABM mode, possibly in violation of the ABM 
Treaty, includes development of an ATM.49 
On the other hand, one wonders how to interpret the repeated Soviet 
complaints that Pershing I1 would allow them only 6 to 8 minutes of warning 
time. (The Soviets naturally never indicate how much warning time Euro- 
peans could expect prior to the impact of their INF RVs, or indeed how much 
warning time U.S. coastal, or West European, targets could have prior to the 
47. Indeed, the Soviets may surprise many Western observers by choosing themselves to 
propose revisions in the ABM Treaty regime or to end it. This essay is concerned primarily with 
current Alliance issues posed by prospective U.S. BMD decisions, and therefore reflects the 
widespread Western assumption that the Soviets will be reacting to U.S. and NATO decisions, 
not vice versa. Soviet decisions for BMD could substantially change the current climate of 
opinion regarding BMD in the United States and Western Europe. Soviet incentives (e.g., 
protecting key assets from a U.S. second strike) and disincentives (e.g., prospective alleviation 
of U.S. ICBM vulnerability) for BMD deployments constitute a large subject distinct from the 
purposes of this essay. See the DoD assessment of Soviet BMD in U.S., Senate, Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Hearings, Part 5, June 
1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 466. 
48. William F. and Harriet Fast Scott cited by Henry Bradsher in Washington Star, July 16, 1981, 
49. Winton, “Applications of BMD,” pp. 9G97; cf. Senator Jake Garn, ”Soviet Violations of 
SALT I,” Policy Review, Number 9 (Summer 1979), pp. 24-28. 
p. 10. 
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impact of Soviet SLBM RVs.) If sincere, the complaints could imply lack of 
confidence in their ATM upgrade capability. The Soviet ATM research and 
development program against Pershing I1 has been described as "aggres- 
ance of penetrating future Soviet de fense~ , "~~  partly because the GLCM- 
Pershing I1 combination stresses Soviet defenses and both have potential for 
penetrability measures upgrade.52 The Soviet complaints about Pershing I1 
could, moreover, also be part of the Soviet political strategy of portraying 
NATO INF modernization as "aggressive." 
The Soviet political response to ATM would be an extension of the bar- 
gaining posture the Soviets have already assumed. U.S. interest in an actual 
ATM program would be seized and exploited for a variety of media themes: 
the unmasking of the truly aggressive "war-fighting" intentions of the West, 
the threat to strategic stability and world peace in violating the ABM Treaty 
with ATM, the initiation of a new "arms race" by the capitalist military- 
industrial complex, and so forth. More importantly, a U S .  ATM initiative 
could be perceived by the Soviets as an opportunity to promote antagonism 
between the United States and Western Europe. 
sive" , .50 but the United States officially attributes Pershing I1 "a high assur- 
Alliance Cohesion and ATM 
The Soviet opportunity to promote antagonism would reside in the poten- 
tially divergent U.S. and West European appreciations of the utility of any 
BMD programs, including ATM. While Britain and France would have their 
own national reasons for opposing anything that might alter the ABM Treaty 
regime, these reasons would be endorsed by others in Western Europe and 
reinforced by the general tendency to see BMD as destabilizing and likely to 
promote an expensive and futile "arms race" that could end in war. If the 
United States determined that ATM could be cost-effective and militarily 
useful, and should be pursued as an active program, ATM could provide 
another example of the broad dichotomy in U.S.-NATO European views that 
was noted by Robert W. Komer, when President Carter's undersecretary of 
defense for policy: "Indeed, we Americans are increasingly asking whether 
50. Senator John Warner in DoD Authorization . . . FY 1981, p. 3013. 
51. Caspar W. Weinberger, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 111-72. 
52. William J. Perry, then Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in DoD 
Authorization . . . FY 1982, p. 3018. 
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Europe is as interested in its own defense as is the United States, or perceives 
the same threat.”53 In contrast, Europeans might view the American concerns 
as immoderate. 
Secondary Alliance cohesion problems could arise if ATM programs were 
accepted by the Alliance. Intra-Alliance disputes could concern what systems 
and localities would be entitled to ATM protection, while ATM protection 
could be opposed for specific localities or for specific purposes. 
Milita y Rationales for ATM 
The precise military purposes ATM might serve have yet to be fully clarified. 
The statement by James Wade cited above (one of the few official comments 
on ATMs potential utility) stresses the prospective gain in survivability for 
NATO’s new INF if one did not have to count on the Soviets cooperatively 
providing warning time to NATO before engaging in strikes against the INF. 
If INF survivability were more thoroughly assured, the INF deterrent threat 
to the Soviet Union would be more formidable-for pre-war deterrence and, 
depending on the thickness of the defenses and their endurance potential, 
for intra-war deterrence as well. While INF survivability may be adequately 
assured through warning time, mobility, and dispersal, fixed targets would 
remain vulnerable. If fixed targets such as airfields, nuclear weapons storage 
sites, and certain command, control, and communications (C3) centers were 
also equipped with ATM defenses, the damage-limiting capabilities might 
significantly increase Soviet uncertainty as to the prospects of successful 
attack against NATO. ATM might, in particular, obstruct probable Soviet 
plans for pre-emptive nuclear strikes against theater nuclear weapons targets 
in Western Europe. 
This concept, which one might call “theater damage-limiting for defense 
and deterrence,” would be most practical and convincing if used in defense 
of hardened sites, especially INF and fixed C3 centers. Defense of C3 centers 
could in particular have a ”force multiplier” effect, while allowing current C3 
vulnerabilities to persist simply offers the Soviets a lucrative opportunity to 
degrade the effectiveness of all types of forces.54 The Soviets could over- 
whelm almost any defenses, if determined to do so, yet obliging the Soviets 
to increase the scale of their attack could be seen as raising the probability of 
53. Robert Komer cited in Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 3, 1980, p. 57. 
54. William R. Graham, “Reducing the Vulnerability of Retaliatory Forces and Command, 
Control and Communications: A Question of Balance,” in David S. Yost, ed., NATO’s Strategic 
Options: Arms Control and Defense (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 170-178. 
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bringing about retaliation by U.S. strategic nuclear forces against the Soviet 
Union. 
ATM could thus be considered a non-provocative and defensive means of 
denying the Soviets any opportunity they might wrongly perceive of rela- 
tively low-cost victory through selective theater nuclear strikes. Deterrence 
and stability would be enhanced, because obliging the Soviets to use far 
more nuclear warheads would raise the risks to the Soviet Union. If truly 
”thick” and cost-effective ATM defenses could be constructed, the Soviet 
potential for nuclear blackmail against Western Europe might be so severely 
eroded that doubts about the credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear guar- 
antee would become an almost secondary concern. 
Another possible military rationale for ATM might be escalation control. 
At present, it is assumed that NATO would receive warning time sufficient 
for dispersal of the new INF, and that the warning time would have to be 
used to assure the survival of the INF. In a crisis situation, it seems likely 
that some Western politicians would argue that actual dispersal of the INF 
would be provocative, i.e., likely to aggravate the crisis and make war more 
unavoidable; and yet failure to disperse could equal the destruction of the 
INF. If ATM defenses were available, warning time and prompt dispersal 
would be less necessary. Political control over escalation processes might be 
enhanced if there were less military operational incentive to engage in seem- 
ingly provocative behavior. 
None of the above military rationales is likely to have much appeal in 
Western Europe. Such rationales-especially the ”protracted war” concept 
of “enduring” survivability-would appear more oriented toward actual war- 
fighting than toward deterrence. West Europeans generally are unwilling to 
accept the Soviet view (increasingly respected in the United States) that 
deterrent capabilities are a product of operationally effective war-fighting 
capabilities. Instead, West Europeans (even more than Americans) tend to 
favor a ”deterrence-only” perspective based on threatening strategic nuclear 
retaliation against Soviet society. The U.S. threat to retaliate against the 
Soviet homeland is enough, they generally feel, to deter any Soviet invasion. 
In Ian Smart’s words, “West European political leaders and their electorates 
have rarely, if ever, been willing to devote serious attention to what would 
happen if the deterrence of initial attack by threat of intolerable penalty 
should 
The favorable reception in West European circles of McGeorge Bundy‘s 
55. Smart, ”Perspectives From Europe,” p. 186. 
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keynote address to the 1979 Conference of the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies is a bit of anecdotal evidence for the same point. Above all, 
West Europeans drew comfort from Bundy’s insistence that deterrence of 
any Soviet attack is well assured: 
. . . no one knows that a major engagement in Europe would escalate to the 
strategic nuclear level. But the essential point is the opposite; no one can 
possibly know that it would 
Bundy’s affirmation as to the genuine possibility of escalation was reassuring 
to Europeans because they prefer a concept of deterrence without intra-war 
escalation boundaries. West European faith in strategic deterrence is often 
associated with the assumption that more credible theater war-fighting ca- 
pabilities would undermine strategic nuclear deterrence. The threat to punish 
Soviet society is the bedrock of deterrence in their view, not an ability to 
defeat a Soviet offensive against Western Europe. 
The possible military rationales for ATM outlined above would, however, 
not only sound intolerably bellicose to many West Europeans; such rationales 
could also seem subtly designed to decouple the U.S. guarantee and to 
confine war to Europe. Protecting the new INF could be seen as creating a 
distinct “Eurostrategic” level of potential conflict, something the December 
1979 NATO decision on INF was intended to avoid. Given the abiding 
concerns of West Europeans, many would suspect the United States of 
improving conditions for successful war-fighting in Europe out of a desire to 
confine a war to that region. What one might call the ”incalculability of 
escalation” could be undermined in European perceptions if ATM promised 
to increase prospects for holding conflict to the theater level. 
Using ATM to avoid premature dispersal of INF in order to enhance 
political control over the escalation process would not necessarily be an 
appealing argument in Western Europe because it would underline the po- 
tential vulnerability of the INF to Soviet attack. Because ATM defenses could 
be seen as guaranteeing intensive Soviet strikes intended to overwhelm them 
and destroy the INF, West European officials are likely to prefer to stress the 
probability that deterrence will not fail and the adequacy of dispersal through 
mobility and warning time as means of survivability for the INF. The risk of 
appearing ”provocative” by dispersing the INF would have to be set against 
1) the risk of appearing too frightened and vulnerable to do so; 2) the 
contrasting message of firmness and readiness to act-constructive for “crisis 
56. McGeorge Bundy, “The Future of Strategic Deterrence,” Survival, Vol. 21, No. 6 (November/ 
December, 1979), p. 271. 
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management”-that dispersal might usefully transmit; and 3) the risk of the 
INF being destroyed in their peacetime basing areas. 
Strategic rationale arguments against ATM could also be derived from the 
“flexible response” doctrine of NATO. First, it could be argued, at present 
NATO assumes that whatever nascent ATM capability the Soviets have is 
inadequate for defense against the Pershing 11. However, if the Soviets built 
up their own ATM capabilities, the option within “flexible response” of what 
might be called ”deliberate limited escalation” would be undermined by 
Soviet defenses. NATO’s strikes would have to be more extensive to achieve 
similar effects, a fact which might be seen as harmful to escalation control. 
A second strategic rationale argument against ATM would apply if the kill 
mechanism were nuclear. An ATM system would be used as necessary to 
destroy incoming RVs threatening defended targets. If the kill mechanism 
were nuclear, this would amount to NATO’s using nuclear weapons reac- 
tively against an ”accidental” target. This situation would contradict the West 
European preference, for deliberately controlled political use of nuclear weap- 
ons if nuclear weapons ever have to be used. It is still assumed (despite 
mounting evidence of the nuclear orientation of Soviet theater forces) that, 
unless the Soviets initiate their aggression with a pre-emptive nuclear strike, 
NATO would precede the Soviets in making decisions on initial use of 
nuclear weapons, and that the initial use should be planned primarily for 
political effect with the resultant military effects of secondary importance. 
A third strategic rationale (as well as an Alliance cohesion) argument 
directly follows. A nuclear warhead ATM could not be effective unless it 
could respond to incoming RVs automatically. This would require an agree- 
ment in advance among the Allies to use the weapons, with a pre-delegation 
of release authority, unless the United States were to insist on a strict inter- 
pretation of the 1962 Athens guidelines on consultation only ”time and 
circumstances permitting.” It would be politically very awkward for the 
United States to so insist. It would be no less difficult for the United States 
to obtain advance approval of nuclear release from the Allies.57 Even if it 
57. Some observers consider the nuclear-armed Nike-Hercules air defense system to be virtually 
unusable for these reasons. There is a linkage between Nike-Hercules and the Patriot in that the 
NNK Patriot for air defense is scheduled to replace the Nike-Hercules, and in that an ATM with 
a nuclear kill mechanism might be more readily accepted in Western Europe if presented as a 
successor to the Nike-Hercules system. It has been reported for years that West Europeans 
would like to retain the nuclear high-altitude anti-air capability that Nike-Hercules represents, 
and for this reason at least a nuclear successor system with ATM potential might be acceptable. 
(Cf. Walter Pincus in The Washington Post, November 1, 1981; and Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, August 29, 1977, pp. 4748.) 
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were a case of defending against incoming SS-20 RVs, many West European 
officials might argue that warning system malfunctions could lead to a rapid 
and unnecessary escalation of a crisis if any nuclear explosion took place. 
The advantages reliable NNK would offer are again apparent. 
INF Modernization and ATM 
The impact an actual U.S. ATM program might have on the ongoing INF 
modernization program is indeterminate, but some European officials are 
concerned that the impact could be harmful in a number of ways. If the ATM 
required a nuclear warhead, it would constitute a new nuclear system for 
possible introduction into Western Europe, and hence a new focus of con- 
troversy. Moreover, whether nuclear or NNK, ATM would represent a suf- 
ficiently dramatic development to ”overload” the West European decision- 
making process. European governments are reluctant to see any new dra- 
matic issues raised (such as enhanced radiation battlefield weapons, chemical 
weapons, new mid-range nuclear missiles, etc.) that might make implemen- 
tation of the December 1979 decisions on INF arms control and modernization 
even more difficult. 
Some West Europeans might see ATM as a justification for not proceeding 
with the INF modernization decision, even if ATM were presented as a long- 
term necessity for defense of the new INF. Various arguments might be 
made to this effect: 
-Given the ATM possibility, should the INF decision and its rationale not 
be re-examined in order to find a more optimal mix of systems and basing 
for ATM defenses? 
-Why introduce new offensive systems at all if the problem posed by the 
SS-20 and other Soviet theater ballistic missiles can be solved effectively 
and directly through defensive systems that would not pose a threat the 
Soviets might perceive as “aggressive” ? 
-Given the likelihood that the Soviets would try to overwhelm any ATM, 
should any land-based systems be deployed at all? 
A number of influential West Europeans are already concerned that land- 
based INF would constitute attractive targets in Soviet eyes, and an ATM 
program might tend to underline that probability. In the words of Carl 
Friedrich von Weiszacker, ”In case of a crisis, these weapons would naturally 
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be the targets of a Russian first strike. The necessity of avoiding such crises 
would make Europe more vulnerable to b la~kmai l .”~~ 
ATM and Arms Control 
Would ATM violate the ABM Treaty? The ATM concept is distinct from the 
purpose of the ABM Treaty, which defines an ABM system as “a system to 
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory” (Ar- 
ticle 11). Some observers therefore argue that ATM could be developed and 
deployed while complying with the ABM Treaty. After all, the purpose of an 
ATM would be to protect theater military assets.59 
On the other hand, Article IX of the ABM Treaty states that “each Party 
undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its 
national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.” 
This provision of the Treaty could be used by the Soviets and by Western 
European (and American) opponents of ATM to argue that ATM represents 
an attempt to circumvent the ABM Treaty. It could rapidly become apparent 
that, even if the Treaty language does not explicitly exclude ATM, politically 
and in terms of public perceptions, ATM is covered by the Treaty’s limita- 
tions. 
Even if the United States were to point out that the ATM would not be 
capable of protecting continental U.S.-based assets, the Soviets would re- 
spond that this proves that U.S. “forward-based systems” (FBS) in Europe- 
mostly aircraft-must be limited by arms control measures. FBS are more 
threatening to the Soviets, if more survivable; the Soviets would therefore 
insist even more emphatically that FBS be included in the INF negotiations. 
The ABM Treaty issue could raise ”arms race’’ and ”destabilization” specters 
that might be almost impossible to exorcise in the social democratic circles of 
Western Europe, even with an NNK ATM. The more effective an ATM is, 
the more it will look like an ABM, even if incapable of defense against SLBM 
and ICBM RVs. Ironically, therefore, the less effective the ATM, the easier 
it might be to deploy in terms of public relations. While the ideal ATM would 
also be capable of intercepting SLBM and ICBM RVs, even an ATM capable 
58. Carl-Friedrich von Weiszacker, ”Can a Third World War Be Prevented?” International Secu- 
rity, Vol. 5 ,  No. 1 (Summer 1980), p. 204. 
59. See, for example, Winton, ”Applications of BMD,” p. 97. Cf. Medalia, Antiballistic Missiles, 
p. 17. 
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only of intercepting Soviet INF could be part of a set of measures enhancing 
deterrence and security in Europe. 
General arms control and detente issues follow directly from this situation. 
The Soviets might very well propose inclusion of ATM in the INF negotiations 
or in some other arms control forum, and the suggestion would probably be 
heartily approved by many sectors of West European opinion. It would be 
hard for the United States to extricate itself from such an arms control 
negotiation offer without being portrayed as a ”warmonger.” ATMs inclu- 
sion in the INF negotiations would tend to protract an already complex and 
difficult set of negotiations, and could make useful results even less likely. 
These negotiations already promise to disappoint many in Western Europe 
with unrealistic expectations about arms control, and to strain further the 
fabric of the Alliance.60 
Conclusion 
The sensitivity of West European governments and publics regarding all 
types of BMD is a factor the United States will have to consider as it examines 
options that might require revision of the ABM Treaty or that might be so 
perceived (i.e., ATM). Neither homeland BMD options nor the long-dormant 
ATM question have been raised explicitly by the United States with West 
European governments. It is possible that, when and if a BMD question is 
raised officially, political and technical circumstances will have changed sig- 
nificantly from the current situation. Highly convincing BMD technology 
(especially for NNK), perceptions of an increased Soviet threat, heightened 
feelings of dependence on U.S. military power, favorable (i.e., U.S.) financ- 
ing arrangements, and/or other factors could combine to persuade West 
Europeans to accept, however begrudgingly, a new U.S. and NATO strategy 
of damage-limiting for defense and deterrence-i.e., an ability to deny the 
Soviets victory by defending selected military targets. 
No reassessment of NATO’s general strategic outlook could be more fun- 
damental. At present, NATO’s deterrent strategy is based on the assumption 
60. Some observers have suggested that an ATM could also be employed as a surface-to-surface 
missile, in which case an arms control problem might be posed in terms of “changing the 
numbers” of systems that might target the Soviet Union. The Patriot used in a surface-to-surface 
role would not, however, have the range to threaten the Soviet Union. Nor does it seem 
probable that any ATM system now likely to be developed would have a range encompassing 
Soviet territory. 
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that any East-West conflict could rapidly lead to an escalation process ulti- 
mately including U.S. strategic nuclear strikes against Soviet society. The 
U.S., Western Europe, and NATO military forces are almost completely 
vulnerable to Soviet nuclear threats, except for limited air and civil defenses 
and, above all, the threat to severely punish Soviet society in retaliation. 
Both aspects of the posture-the ultimate reliance on a threat to kill millions 
of Soviet citizens, and the virtually complete absence of effective defenses- 
could prove most unsatisfactory guarantees of security in war. If technically 
feasible and cost-effective, damage-limiting capabilities could deny the So- 
viets part of their ability to threaten the United States and Western Europe, 
and make it less necessary for the Alliance to threaten harm to Soviet society. 
An ability to physically deny the Soviets their plausible military objectives 
could become a yardstick for Alliance strategy superior to the ambiguities of 
”flexible response.” Since the most plausible Soviet military objectives are 
not cities but military targets that could be relatively (though imperfectly) 
well defended, Soviet strategies for nuclear war-fighting and victory could 
be thwarted, and deterrence strengthened, by damage-limiting capabilities 
that increase Soviet uncertainties about prospects for successful pre-emptive 
attack. 
The lack of damage-limiting capabilities in the West tends to drive Alliance 
strategy into embracing politically convenient ambiguities. The ambiguities 
about what “flexible response” might mean operationally are partly intended 
to conceal the scarcity of militarily sensible retaliatory options (given the lack 
of damage-limiting means) from the Soviets and Western publics. ”Flexible 
response” thus ultimately rests heavily on the threat to unleash a conflict 
that could lead to the destruction of much of North America and Eurasia. 
Damage-limiting could assist NATO in becoming less dependent on this 
threat. All that Alliance strategists can hope for at present is that mutual 
restraint in a “crisis management” process will be able to control nuclear 
conflict, for the West has virtually no ability to enforce damage limitations 
through active (non-counterforce) defensesU6l 
Reassessment of the merits of damage-limiting is long overdue, and change 
61. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities are here assumed to constitute a form of coun- 
terforce, as opposed to active defenses that could intercept ballistic missile RVs or air-breathing 
systems in flight. Even if one hypothesizes that Western ASW could neutralize Soviet SSBNs 
pre-emptively (a highly improbable feat for several reasons, including the fact that land-based 
ASW communications and detection means would be at risk in war), the threat to Western 
society from Soviet air-breathing systems and land-based ballistic missiles would remain dire. 
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may be imminent. BMD, perhaps in conjunction with a deceptive-basing 
system, is one of three concepts for long-term MX basing under consideration 
by the Reagan administration. Congress, in the Fiscal Year 1982 Appropria- 
tions Act, has mandated reporting a final selection of an MX-basing mode by 
July 1983, and decisions may be made by April 1983.62 While the scheduled 
October 1982 second five-year review of the ABM Treaty may therefore pass 
without either U.S. or Soviet proposals for revision, the United States may 
elect to propose amendments later, perhaps as  a result of the MX-basing 
decision. Amendments to the ABM Treaty may be proposed at any time; and 
either party may withdraw, with six months’ notice, if it judges that “ex- 
traordinary events” related to the Treaty’s subject matter have ”jeopardized 
its supreme interests.” 
On the other hand, doubts about the maturity of BMD technology persist 
in some political and technical circles. The possibility that the Soviets have 
a superior ABM Treaty “break-out” potential owing to their greater invest- 
ments in BMD (and air defense) research may be another argument for U.S. 
caution in proposing major changes in the ABM Treaty. Extensive research 
(particularly on NNK) seems likely before ATM will become an immediate 
option. The BMD technology and costs will be key factors in determining 
whether a shift away from the West’s prevailing theory of deterrence (societal 
punishment) to one partaking of greater elements of damage-limiting is 
feasible. One might then consider whether, given possible Soviet counter- 
measures, a damage-limiting strategy-or at least improved damage-limiting 
capabilities, especially for defense of selected strategic and theater military 
targets-would be sensible. 
Technological opportunity may not, however, determine the rejection or 
choice of damage-limiting measures as much as established convictions re- 
garding BMD and its political, diplomatic, and financial costs. Less costly 
BMD technology might reduce the financial burden, but the question of 
political will to pursue damage-limiting programs over the long term would 
remain. Without domestic or Alliance consensus on the strategic merits of 
damage-limiting, the United States would find it hard to sustain BMD de- 
ployment decisions. Moreover, U.S. political will to pursue analysis of BMD 
options seriously and to reassess Alliance strategy in the light of potential 
damage-limiting opportunities is not likely to be stiffened by encouragement 
from the Allies in Western Europe. 
62. Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 5,  1982, p. 23. 
